

Chief, Geographic Research

10 February 1954

Chief, Geography Division

Intelligence Abroad

A. PROBLEMS

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As a result of [REDACTED] recent trip to the Far East, it has become obvious that intelligence personnel in Washington did not have adequate knowledge of what was going on abroad. Knowledge was lacking in the following categories:

1. Washington agencies did not know of important research programs that were being conducted independently by U.S. organizations in the Far East. Particularly notable was the lack of knowledge of research on China [REDACTED] All-most no definite information on this subject was known in Washington, not even on the most important research program and production [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] Knowledge of U.S. research programs in the Philippines was similarly lacking. Without such knowledge it is impossible to properly coordinate research and intelligence reporting activities. Some kinds of research can be best done in the field, but knowledge and coordination should exist somewhere in Washington.

2. Washington agencies did not know what valuable research materials were being held in the libraries of U.S. research organizations in the Far East. This deficiency is part of the whole problem of lack of knowledge and coordination between Washington and the field.

3. Washington agencies did not know what publications of intelligence value were being produced by foreign governmental or private organizations. This was true of all the countries visited [REDACTED]

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4. The situation in Europe and the Near East is even more critical. Intelligence of the type much needed by the Geographic Area, in fact the whole geographic intelligence community, abounds in sizeable quantities in Europe, but it never reaches Washington. Not only is geographic intelligence research being

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
carried on (which seldom reaches this Area and others) but the geographic intelligence which is not gleaned at such interrogation centers [REDACTED] is appalling in its quantity.

5. Lamentably, in this critical area where intelligence on our most formidable potential enemies, the USSR and Satellites, actually begs to be taken, there are intelligence specialists gathering political, economic, sociological, military, and scientific intelligence but not a soul represents the field of geography. Even CIA is well represented [REDACTED] but the Geographic Area receives little or nothing from these representatives.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It is recommended that:

a. ORR establish a geographic officer [REDACTED] with responsibility for the entire Far East;



2. The functions of these geographic officers would be as follows:

a. maintain liaison between ORR and U.S. research offices in the Far East and be responsible for reporting on research organizations and research programs of intelligence value. This would permit better coordination in Washington of research on the Far East and would enable more efficient use to be made of research facilities.

b. report on new publications of intelligence value. This is a field almost completely neglected except for Communist Chinese publications, and the procurement of Chinese materials is not yet coordinated. There are no publication procurement officers or geographic attaches now stationed in the Far East

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except for a [REDACTED] who handles Communist Chinese publications. Procurement could be handled through requests from Washington to the embassies for specific items that have been reported by the geographic officer.

c. report on foreign research organizations and their research programs. Some of this reporting could be accomplished by collecting information from Americans in the field who have established contacts with these organizations, but who have no idea that such information is worth reporting.

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d. The functions of the geographic officers [REDACTED] would be similar to or the same as the one [REDACTED]. In addition, he should have the heavy responsibility of directing and advising such refugee interrogation centers as REC and DRC. 25X1A6a 25X1A6a

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C. CONSIDERATIONS

Should the [REDACTED] become effective the following points should be taken into consideration: 25X1C4a

1. [REDACTED] would in no way impinge on, interfere with, or duplicate the activities of the Geographic Attache. On the contrary, it is quite possible that the two officers can complement and supplement each other's work and enjoy a healthy cooperation. 25X1C4a

2. The professional direction of the [REDACTED] Officers will originate in the Geography Division and be directed to the officers through the Chief, Geographic Area, such as the direction of the Geographic Attache program is worked.

3. Although this point need not be a critical one in determining the location of a [REDACTED] post, it is highly desirable that he work out of a DD/P outpost so that he is always in a position to tap the tremendous amount of intelligence which comes in with operational reports which has always been denied to the Intelligence Area by DD/P. The 25X1C4a

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officer in turn could render valuable assistance to the planning of operations should he be consulted. It is quite patent that a geographer would be of immeasurable assistance to the China operations office [REDACTED] for example.

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4. It is recognized that the Geographic Area as it is now staffed and with its present workload will be unable to supply either slots or personnel to implement the proposed [REDACTED]

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D/CG: [REDACTED] :ae

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